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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Douglas Jamal Hambrick appeals from his conviction for trafficking in cocaine.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
Police attempted to set up a controlled buy of half an ounce of cocaine from
Hambrick through a Cl.

(Tr., p.132, Ls.9-23; PSI, p.2.)

Hambrick rejected the deal,

inviting the Cl to buy a full ounce instead and suggesting that he pool his money with a
friend to afford it. (Tr., p.247, L.17 - p.248, L.9; PSI, p.2.) The Cl agreed to purchase
the cocaine with a friend, and Hambrick agreed to sell the ounce of cocaine for $900.
(Tr., p.135, L.1 - p.136, L.19; PSI, p.2.)

Detective Harmon was enlisted to go

undercover and pose as the Cl's friend for the deal. (Tr., p.135, Ls.1-11; p.168, Ls.11O; PSI, p.2.)
Hambrick directed the detective and Cl to an apartment complex where
Hambrick's supplier, Jeremy Fraser, gave him one ounce of cocaine, and then
Hambrick delivered the drugs to Detective Harmon. (Tr., p.139, L.2 - p.143, L.19; PSI,
p.2.)

Detective Harmon maintained custody of the drugs, which tested presumptive

positive for cocaine. (Tr., p.173, Ls.14-21; p.201, L.24 - p.202, L.4.) The drugs were
then sent to the State Crime Lab which confirmed the preliminary results. (Tr., p.212,
L.10-p.213, L.18.)
A grand jury indicted Hambrick on the charge of trafficking in cocaine. (R., pp.67.)

The case went to trial, where the State presented evidence on both theories of

trafficking: That Hambrick had represented that he was delivering an ounce of cocaine
(see Tr., p.132, Ls.4-23; p.134, Ls.8-25; p.162, L.18 - p.163, L.2; p.172, Ls.18-25;
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p.232, L.10 - p.233, L.6; p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.9), and that Hambrick had actually
delivered 28 or more grams of cocaine (see Tr., p.173, Ls.16-23; p.175, Ls.14-21;
p.199, L.17- p.200, L.16; p.213, L.19-p.214, L.16; p.218, Ls.15-22).
During the trial Detective Harmon, who personally received the cocaine from
Hambrick and conducted the field test to determine that the substance was cocaine,
testified that he had to destroy some of the cocaine to conduct the test.

(Tr., p.175,

Ls.15-21.) The State planned to elicit an opinion from the detective as to whether the
test consumed more than 1/100th of a gram of the cocaine by presenting a
demonstrative exhibit involving a single gram of artificial sweetener. (Tr., p.177, L.20 p.179, L.10.) Hambrick's counsel objected to both the demonstrative exhibit and the
detective testifying about how much 11100th of a gram is. (Tr., p.176, L.12- p.177, L.8;
p.184, L.17 - p.185, L.2.) After hearing an offer of proof from Detective Harmon, the
district court sustained the objection as to the demonstrative exhibit, but allowed the
detective to testify that he used more than 1/100th of a gram of the cocaine to conduct
the field test. (Tr., p.195, L.12 - p.197, L.8.) Thereafter, Detective Harmon testified that
he could say with a pretty good certainty that he used more than 1/100th of a gram and
more than 2/1 00ths of a gram of cocaine to conduct the field test, but could not say if he
used more than 3/100ths of a gram. (See Tr., p.199, L.17- p.200, L.16; p.245, L.23p.246, L.14.)
After the evidence was in and both parties had rested their cases, Hambrick's
counsel requested a jury instruction on entrapment. (Tr., p.280, L.4 - p.281, L.24.) The
State objected to the instruction on the grounds that there was no evidence that
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Hambrick was not willing and ready to participate in the drug deal. (Tr., p.282, Ls.1-10.)
The district court rejected the entrapment instruction. (Tr., p.282, Ls.11-12.)
The jury convicted Hambrick on the charge of trafficking in cocaine. (R., pp.8788.) The district court entered judgment of conviction on Hambrick and sentenced him
to a unified term of 10 years confinement with three years fixed.
Ham brick filed a timely notice of appea I. (R., pp. 136-38.)
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(R., pp.131-32.)

ISSUES
Hambrick states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Hambrick's conviction
for trafficking in cocaine?
2.
Did the district court err when it allowed Detective Harmon to
provide his opinion over defense counsel's objection, as to how much
cocaine he uses when conducting a presumptive drug test?
3.
Did the district court err when it refused to instruct the jury on
entrapment?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The State rephrases the issues as:
1.
Was there substantial competent evidence admitted at trial from which the jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hambrick was guilty of trafficking in
cocaine?
2.
Has Hambrick failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion in
allowing Detective Harmon to relate how much cocaine he used when conducting the
presumptive drug test?
3.
Hambrick failed to present prima facie evidence of entrapment. Did the district
court therefore properly decline to instruct the jury on entrapment?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There was Substantial Competent Evidence Admitted at Trial from Which the Jury
Could Find that Hambrick Trafficked in Cocaine

A.

Introduction
Hambrick challenges his conviction for trafficking in cocaine, asserting that there

was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he had delivered
28 or more grams of cocaine. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-13.) Hambrick's claim fails. A
review of the record demonstrates that the State presented substantial competent
evidence from which the jury could conclude that Hambrick was guilty of trafficking in
cocaine.

B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a

verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller,
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570,
826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review, the appellate court will not
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,
822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072
(Ct. App. 1987). Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are
construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607;
Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. In determining whether sufficient evidence
5

was presented to support the conviction, the Court reviews the evidence that was
actually presented to the jury, without regard to its ultimate admissibility.

State v.

Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 2010).

C.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence at Trial to Prove the Essential Elements
of Trafficking in Cocaine
The grand jury indicted Hambrick for Trafficking in Cocaine in violation of Idaho

Code§ 37-2732B(a)(2). (R., pp.6-7.) To convict Hambrick on the trafficking charge, the
State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hambrick had possessed
and delivered 28 or more grams of cocaine.

(R., pp.113-16; I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(2).)

Under Idaho Code§ 37-2732B, a defendant may be convicted of trafficking if the actual
weight of the drugs exceeds 28 grams or if the defendant represents the amount to
exceed 28 grams. I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(2), (c); see also State v. Escobar, 134 Idaho 387,
389, 3 P.3d 65, 67 (Ct. App. 2000).

Finding that the State had presented sufficient

evidence for the jury to conclude that Hambrick was guilty of trafficking in cocaine on
either alternative theory, the district court allowed both to go to the jury. (See R., pp.88,
116; Tr., p.286, L 14 - p.288, L.23.)

1.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence for the Jury to Conclude that
Hambrick Represented that He was Selling One Ounce 1 of Cocaine

At trial, the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to be able to conclude
that Hambrick represented that he was selling an ounce of cocaine to the narcotics
detectives. Testimony established that police had attempted to set up a controlled buy
with Hambrick using a criminal informant for half an ounce of cocaine, but Hambrick
One ounce is equivalent to approximately 28.35 grams.
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rejected any deal for less than an ounce. (Tr., p.132, Ls.4-23; p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.5.)
So, police contacted him again and they set up a deal for an ounce of cocaine. (Tr.,
p.134, Ls.8-25; p.246, L.22- p.248, L.5.)
Detective Harmon was enlisted to work undercover, posing as the Cl's friend,
and purchase the ounce of cocaine for $900.

(Tr., p.135, Ls.1-11; p.168, Ls.1-10.)

Detective Bruner, who listened to the deal over the wire, testified that Hambrick told the
undercover detective that he had weighed the cocaine himself and assured him that it
was an ounce. (Tr., p.143, Ls.1-19; p.162, L.18 - p.163, L.2.) Detective Harmon also
testified that Hambrick assured him the cocaine's weight was right. (Tr., p.172, Ls.1825.)

On appeal, Hambrick asserts that the jury could have only speculated that

Hambrick was representing that the cocaine weighed an ounce based on this
statement.

(Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)

Hambrick's argument misunderstands the

distinction between proper inference and improper speculation, and ignores Detective
Harmon's testimony that because the deal was set up for an ounce, Hambrick's
assurance that the "weight was good" meant that he had in fact delivered the ounce he
had promised. (Tr., p.232, L.10 - p.233, L.6; Tr., p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.9.)
Recognizing that the deal had been set up for an ounce of cocaine, and that
Hambrick assured the detective that he had delivered the agreed upon weight, the jury
could have easily and correctly inferred that Hambrick had represented the cocaine to
weigh an ounce.
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2.

The State Presented Sufficient Evidence for the Jury to Conclude that
Hambrick Actually Delivered At Least 28 Grams of Cocaine

The State also presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Hambrick actually delivered at least 28 grams of cocaine to the
narcotics detectives.

Ms. Owsley, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police,

testified that when she weighed the cocaine, it weighed 27.99 grams.

(Tr., p.213,

Ls.18-22.) Ms. Owsley explained that 11100th of a gram is a very small amount. (Tr.,
p.215, Ls.17-19.)

So small, in fact, that her highly technical scale that is annually

calibrated still has a margin of error of plus or minus 1/100th of a gram. (Tr., p.218,
Ls.15-22.)
Ms. Owsley further explained that when she weighs drugs, she pours them out
from the packaging onto her scale, but because of its susceptibility to static electricity,
cocaine tends to stick to the packaging. (Tr., p.213, L.23 - p.214, L.12.) Ms. Owsley
estimated that it was possible that 11100th of a gram might have stuck to the plastic
packaging. (Tr., p.214, Ls.13-16.)
Detective Harmon testified that he field tested the cocaine before sending it to
Ms. Owsley for testing. (Tr., p.173, Ls.14-21.) Detective Harmon explained that when
he field tests drugs, a small amount is necessarily destroyed. (Tr., p.175, Ls.15-21.)
He explained that cocaine is especially fine, and for the same reasons it sticks to the
packaging, it also sticks to the sides of the test envelope, so it requires a little more for
field tests than most drugs. (Tr., p.199, L.17 - p.200, L.6.) Detective Harmon, with his
extensive field experience, having tested cocaine a countless number of times, testified
"with pretty good certainty" that he used more than 1/100th of a gram of the cocaine
when he performed the field test. (Tr., p.200, Ls.7-16; p.245, L.23 - p.246, L.14.)
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Based on this evidence, the jury could have concluded that the crime lab's scale,
calibrated to plus or minus 1/100th of a gram, weighed the cocaine at minus 11100th of
a gram.

The jury could have found Detective Harmon's testimony credible and

concluded that he destroyed more than 11100th of a gram of the cocaine to conduct his
experiment. Or, because 1/100th of a gram is such a small weight, the jury could have
concluded that such an amount stuck to the inside of the plastic bag and was therefore
not weighted.

Or the jury could have found some combination of all the above.

Regardless, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the cocaine
actually weighed 28 or more grams when Hambrick delivered it to Detective Harmon.

3.

The Court Should Decline Hambrick's Invitation to Abandon Its
Longstanding Precedent Governing Appellate Review of Sufficiency of the
Evidence Where One Crime Can Be Committed Multiple Ways

Because the State presented sufficient evidence at trial to support either theory
on the cocaine's weight, whether represented or actual, this Court need not address
Hambrick's invitation to abandon its long-held precedent established in State v. Enyeart,
123 Idaho 452, 849 P.2d 125 (Ct. App. 1993).

However, even were this Court to

conclude that the State only presented sufficient evidence as to one theory of weight,
the State still met its burden under this Court's precedent and Hambrick has not
presented any compelling reason to abandon that precedent.
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedents. The rule of stare

decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is manifestly wrong,
unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice."
State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho
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657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119
Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,
1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[PJrior decisions of this Court should govern unless
they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v.
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this
question, and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the
Court must be] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as
expressed in [its] earlier opinions.").
It is well-established that a general jury verdict is valid so long as it is legally
supportable on one of the submitted grounds. See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46,
49 (1991); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991); Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 45556, 849 P.2d at 128-29. Hambrick asserts that this precedent should be rejected under
the due process clause of the Idaho State Constitution. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.)
However, Hambrick has failed to show how his due process rights are in anyway
implicated by this case.
Idaho Code§ 37-2732B criminalizes drug trafficking. The elements of trafficking
in cocaine are set out as (a) delivering (b) cocaine (c) in a weight of 28 or more grams.
See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(2).

Under the statute, the State is permitted to establish the

weight element through either actual or represented weight. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a),
(c). Having alternative means of establishing an element of a crime does nothing to
alter the essential elements of the crime, nor does it create a new crime, therefore a
defendant's due process rights are not implicated. See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho
970, 977-78, 188 P.3d 912, 919-20 (2008) (citing Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S.
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813, 817 (1999); Schad, 501 U.S. at 633).

Hambrick has presented no compelling

rationale for this Court to abandon its longstanding precedents established in Enyeart,
et al. The jury's verdict, supported by competent, substantial evidence, should therefore
be affirmed.

11.
Hambrick has Failed to Establish an Abuse of the District Court's Discretion in Admitting
Detective Harmon's Opinion Testimony
A.

Introduction
Hambrick contends that the district court abused its discretion by allowing

Detective Harmon to opine regarding how much cocaine, in the 100ths of grams, he
personally destroys when performing his field tests.

(Appellant's brief, pp.13-16.)

Hambrick's argument fails. The district court properly exercised its discretion in allowing
the detective's opinion testimony which related to a fact within his personal knowledge.
Hambrick has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's discretion.

B.

Standard o-f Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). Specifically, whether
sufficient foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence is committed to the
discretion of the trial court. State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 81, 190 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct.
App. 2008). Absent an abuse of that discretion, the decision to admit opinion evidence
will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 454, 849 P.2d 125,
127 (Ct. App. 1993).
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C.

Detective Harmon's Opinion Testimony was Supported by Adequate Foundation
At trial, the prosecutor planned to illustrate for the jury how very small 1/100th of

a gram is by having Detective Harmon take a one gram pouch of artificial sweetener,
imagine breaking it up into 100 small pieces, and then telling the jury whether he would
have used more or less than one of those pieces to conduct the field test. (Tr., p.177,
L.20 - p.179, L.10.) Hambrick's counsel objected to the whole demonstration, including
Detective Harmon offering "any characterization of what 1/1 00[th] of a gram is going to
be like. He is not a scientist; he is a police officer." (Tr., p.176, L.12- p.177, L.8; p.184,
L.17 - p.185, L.2.) After hearing an offer of proof from the detective, the district court
sustained Hambrick's objection as to the illustration involving the packet of artificial
sweetener, but decided to allow Detective Harmon to testify that he used more than
11100th of a gram of the cocaine for the field test he personally conducted. (Tr., p.195,
L.12-p.197, L.8.)
Lay opinion testimony which is based on a matter within the witness' personal
knowledge and helpful to a determination of a fact in issue is generally admissible.
Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 454, 849 P.2d at 127.

Lay opinion testimony is governed by

Idaho Rule of Evidence 701, which provides:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the testimony of the witness in
the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences
which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b)
helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the
determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
1.R.E. 701.
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After the district court's ruling, Detective Harmon testified that cocaine is
extremely fine in its powder form and, due to static electricity, is sucked to the sides of
the test envelope during field tests. (Tr., p.199, Ls.17-24.} For that reason, cocaine
requires more of the substance than other drugs to get a sample to the bottom of the
test envelope. (Tr., p.199, L.25 - p.200, L.6.} Detective Harmon was asked, "Does it
take, in your opinion, more than 1/100[th] of a gram?"

(Tr., p.200, Ls.7-8.)

He

responded, "In my opinion, yes." (Tr., p.200, L.9.) Then Detective Harmon, asked how
many times he had weighed and field tested cocaine, responded that, as a narcotics
detective, he has "been involved in numerous cocaine purchases," and has "conducted
field tests countless number of times." (Tr., p.200, Ls.10-16.)
This is the very sort of testimony that is contemplated by Rule 701. See State v.
Goerig, 121 Idaho 108, 111-12, 822 P.2d 1005, 1008-09 (Ct. App. 1991) (officer's lay
opinion that field sobriety tests he personally conducted were 95% accurate compared
with breathalyzer, blood, and urine tests admissible under Rule 701 ); Smith v.
Praegitzer, 113 Idaho 887, 892, 749 P.2d 1012, 1017 (Ct. App. 1988) (lay witness's
testimony approximating her speed at between 20 and 25 miles per hour admissible
under Rule 701); Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 454, 849 P.2d at 127 (testimony from EMT with
personal knowledge of the effects of LSD that defendant was under the influence of
LSD admissible under Rule 701).

Hambrick has failed to show that weights and

measures, even under the metric system, are so esoteric as to require "technical or
other specialized knowledge" that would not permit the detective who personally
conducted the field test to opine that he used more than 1/100th of a gram of the
cocaine. This testimony was properly admitted under Rule 701.
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Later, during redirect, the prosecutor asked Detective Harmon to look at the bag
of cocaine that had been seized and imagine the many 1/1 00ths of a gram it contained.
(Tr., p.245, L.23 - p.246, L.2.)

The prosecutor then asked if, based on Detective

Harmon's experience, the amount he used in the field test would "be the equivalent of
two or three of those 1/1 00[ths] of a gram." (Tr., p.246, Ls.3-7.)

Detective Harmon

responded:
A: Yes. I can tell you that, with pretty good certainty, that I use more than
1/1 00[thJ of a gram to NIK test.
Q: More than 2/1 00[ths]?
A: Yes.
Q: More than 3/1 00[ths]?
A: No.
(Tr., p.246, Ls.8-14.)
On appeal, Hambrick interprets Detective Harmon's testimony to mean that "he
used more than 2/100 of a gram but less than 3/100 of a gram when conducting a
presumptive drug test"

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.)

Taken in context, however, it

appears that a more accurate reading of the detective's testimony is that he could say
"with pretty good certainty" that he used more than 1/100th of a gram of cocaine to
conduct the field test, and he could say "with pretty good certainty" that he used more
than 2/1 00ths of a gram to conduct the test, but he could not say "with pretty good
certainty" that he used more than 3/1 00ths of a gram for the field test.

Detective

Harmon is not offering expert witness testimony expressing scientific certainty that
cocaine field tests consume between exactly 2/1 00ths and 3/1 00ths of a gram of
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cocaine; he is simply offering his own opinion of approximately how much he could say
with a reasonable certainty that he actually used, based on his personal experience.
Hambrick has again failed to show that expressing such an opinion requires
"technical or other specialized knowledge." Rather, as per Rule 701, it merely requires
personal knowledge, which Detective Harmon had due to his lengthy experience in
narcotics interdiction and the fact that he personally conducted the field test. (See Tr.,
p.173, L.14- p.174, L.15; p.200, Ls.10-16.)
Hambrick's argument on appeal is that Detective Harmon was not qualified as an
expert witness, so he cou Id not testify with scientific certainty how many 1/1 00ths of a
gram of cocaine are used to conduct a field test.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)

Detective Harmon's testimony, however, did not embrace the scientific certainty to
which Hambrick objects on appeal. The district court specifically found that Detective
Harmon's testimony was not offered "to prove the final point to some scientific
certainty." (Tr., p.195, L.22 - p.196, L.17.) Rather, his testimony was offered as an
opinion to something within his personal knowledge, namely, that he used more than
1/100th of a gram of the cocaine to conduct the field test. (Tr., p.199, L.25 - p.200, L.9;
p.246, Ls.3-14.)
Detective Harmon testified that (a) he had conducted countless field tests on
cocaine, (b) in his experience, cocaine required more of the substance to get an
accurate test than other drugs, and (c) that amount was certainly more than 1/100th of a
gram, certainly more than 2/1 00ths of a gram, but he could not say for certain that it was
more than 3/1 00ths of a gram.

Detective Harmon, as a narcotics detective with

substantial experience field testing and weighing cocaine, and as the narcotics detective
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who actually conducted the field test in question, was imminently qualified to offer that
opinion under Rule 701. The district court was therefore correct to allow that testimony
to go to the jury for them to determine what weight and credibility to give to it. That
exercise of the district court's discretion should be affirmed.

D.

Harmless Error
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 directs that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."

I.C.R. 52.

"The

erroneous admission of evidence does not in every case require reversal. Such error
will be deemed harmless if an appellate court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneously admitted evidence contributed
to the conviction." State v. Rodriquez, 106 Idaho 30, 33, 674 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Ct. App.
1983). Alternatively, an error is harmless if an appellate court is able to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the error.
State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 911, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058 (2003); State v.
Moore, 131 Idaho 814,821,965 P.2d 174,181 (1998).
Even adopting Hambrick's interpretation of Detective Harmon's statement, that
the detective testified that he used between 2/1 00ths and 3/1 00ths of a gram of cocaine
to conduct his field test, review of the record establishes that admitting the challenged
testimony was harmless.

Detective Harmon's testimony supported the State's theory

that the cocaine's actual weight at delivery was at least 28 grams, despite the lab
having weighed it at 27.99 grams. Unchallenged evidence admitted at trial established
that Detective Harmon destroyed some quantity of the cocaine while conducting his field
test, that some quantity of the cocaine stuck to the bag and was therefore not weighed,
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and that 1/100th of a gram is so small it is within the margin of error for the State lab's
highly sensitive scales. Whether Detective Harmon used 1/100th of a gram, 2/1 00ths of
a gram, or precisely 2.5/1 00ths of a gram of the cocaine to conduct his field test is
immaterial to the salient, unchallenged fact that he did use some of the cocaine.
Furthermore, there is no reasonable possibility that the complained of portion of
the detective's testimony might have contributed to Hambrick's conviction for trafficking
in cocaine, because the evidence was overwhelming that Hambrick had represented the
cocaine's weight as an ounce. The jury would have reached the same result absent the
challenged testimony because the challenged testimony was only a small part of the
case against Hambrick. Accordingly, given the weight of the other evidence admitted,
there can be no reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result
without the admission of Detective Harmon's challenged testimony.

Any error is

therefore harmless and the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

111.
The District Court Properly Declined to Present a •.Jury Instruction on Entrapment

A

Introduction
Hambrick claims that the district court erred by declining his counsel's request for

a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-21).
Hambrick's claim fails because review of the record demonstrates that Hambrick was
not entitled to an instruction on entrapment. To the contrary, he provided no evidence
of entrapment The district court therefore properly declined to offer the instruction.

17

8.

Standard of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is ultimately a question of law. State v.

Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct. App. 1996). To prevail on the
appellate claim that the district court erred by not giving an entrapment instruction,
Hambrick was required to "show that there is a reasonable view of the evidence
presented that would support the theory of entrapment." Canelo, 129 Idaho at 392, 924
P .2d at 1236.

C.

Hambrick Failed to Present Prima Facie Evidence of Entrapment
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not

supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335
(1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. App. 1986)
(self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). The question thus presented is
whether Hambrick has shown "that there is a reasonable view of the evidence
presented that would support the theory of entrapment." Canelo, 129 Idaho at 392, 924
P .2d at 1236.

A review of the law and the record show that Hamb rick's claim of

entrapment is not supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.
To be entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant must
"present facts sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the) defense." State
v. Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). Such a prima
facie case would require evidence whereby the jury could conclude that Hambrick was:

an otherwise innocent person, not inclined to commit a criminal offense,
[who was] induced to do so by a State agent who. desiring grounds for
prosecution, originat[ed] the criminal design and implant[ed] in the mind of
the innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense.
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State v. Koller, 122 Idaho 409, 411, 835 P.2d 644, 646 (1992) (emphasis original),
quoting State v. Hansen, 105 Idaho 816, 817 n.1, 673 P.2d 416,417 n.1 (1983); see
also Canelo, 129 Idaho at 392, 924 P.2d at 1236; State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 519,
887 P.2d 57, 64 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Mata, 106 Idaho 184,185,677 P.2d 497,498
(Ct. App. 1984).
The record shows that Hambrick presented absolutely no evidence to support
even an inference that he was an otherwise innocent person who lacked the disposition
to traffic in cocaine.

Narcotics detectives directed a Cl to approach Hambrick and

attempt to set up a purchase .of half an ounce of cocaine from Hambrick. (Tr., p.132,
Ls.4-12.) Hambrick correctly notes that the evidence offered at trial established that he
rejected that deal for half an ounce. (Tr., p.132, Ls.4-23, cited Appellant's brief, p.19;
see also Tr., p.248, Ls.3-5.) What Hambrick fails to note is that the evidence also
established that the only reason he rejected the offer was because he was not willing to
sell less than a full ounce of cocaine. (Tr., p.247, L.23 - p.248, L.5.) Hambrick never
refuted this evidence, nor was conflicting evidence ever presented at trial.

Evidence

that Hambrick would not sell cocaine in half ounces because he was only willing to sell it
in full ounces cannot reasonably give rise to an inference that Hambrick lacked the
disposition to sell cocaine.
Hambrick suggested that the Cl purchase a full ounce of cocaine. When the Cl
approached Hambrick the second time, he was setting up a deal on Hambrick's terms.
This Court has long recognized that merely furnishing a defendant the opportunity to
commit an offense, as in this case, does not constitute entrapment and is in fact a
legitimate method for ferreting out crime. Mata, 106 Idaho at 186, 677 P.2d at 499;
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State v. Webster, 46 Idaho 798, 271 P. 578 (1928). Hambrick has failed to establish
that there was any evidence from which the jury could find entrapment. The district
court therefore properly concluded that Hambrick was not entitled to an instruction on
entrapment. The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm Hambrick's conviction for
trafficking in cocaine.
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